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NIC# 03375-84 11 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM

: David Y. McManis

**SUBJECT** 

: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meeting for May 1984

Soviet intransigence towards the US continues to be evidenced

1. Summary of key warning issues:

## USSR

through vituperative propaganda, large Soviet military exercises, nighlighted deployments of submarines near U.S. coasts, a pressure	
application scenario in Berlin, and withdrawal from the Summer	

We (NIO/USSR and NIO/W) agree with the foregoing but would go further and note the likelihood of still bolder Soviet initiatives to try to discredit the U.S. and against which we must be fully on guard.

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# <u>Nicaragua</u>

The main runway at Puente Huete will probably be completed by October, but will lack support facilities. Additionally, construction at Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas Airfields is progressing at a faster pace than in the past. The Cubans may risk flying MIG aircraft to an airfield despite inadequate facilities and defenses when POL is available.

## Suriname

A crisis may be looming as a result of the near depletion of foreign reserves and the need for harsher economic austerity measures. With Prime Minister Udenhout increasingly undermined by Army Commander Bouterse, Suriname may turn to Cuba for economic and military aid in the event that violence returns to the country. In the absence of Brazilian or Western aid, Cuba may see conditions as favorable for a return to Suriname.

## <u>Philippines</u>

The strong showing of the opposition parties in the recent elections shattered the view of Marcos' invincibility, but also slowed the political momentum of the extreme left who did not participate in the elections. The Philippines most serious immediate problem is its financial status. Austerity measures required by the IMF will be difficult for Marcos to steer through the assembly when it convenes in July. He probably cannot meet reform requirements before the end of the year. The situation will be political and economic confusion.

#### Dominican Republic

President Blanco's prevention of a general strike on 9 May through firmness and concessions to workers is a positive sign, but new unrest is likely with IMF-mandated austerity measures.

## Sudan

to Nimeiri's Islamiz	olitical situation in Sudan remains tense. Opposition ration and other policies is beginning to surface in
the military.	
Nev	v instability in Sudan could presage responses from
	may lead to a request for US support in the region.

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#### 2. Trend Commentary

## Romania

In October 1983, we observed that economic problems, lower living standards, and a hard winter would likely cause additional popular unrest resulting in demonstrations and strikes. Since then, following a severe winter, the economy has declined further. There have been problems in energy, transportation and food supplies. The regime is extremely concerned about the mood of the industrial force, but the population has remained generally quiescent. More frequent or larger occurances of unrest would be our first indication that a popular breaking point was approaching.

#### Dutch Decision on INF

The Dutch decision that effectively postpones an INF position puts added importance on allied attitudes. CIA and INR analysts believe that Italian Prime Minister Craxi's Lisbon statements on a weapons moratorium, while probably a political mistake, reflect genuine Italian thinking that a new initiative may be in order. These developments warrant close attention for signs of new allied positions during the remainder of 1984.

## Iran/Iraq

Despite Iran's logistical and military problems, an offensive during the Ramadan period is possible. Iraq should contain the most likely offensive in the Basra area.

#### <u>India</u>

There is continued concern about violence in the Punjab state, and the introduction of regular army forces reflects the high level of government frustration. Recent Indian troop movements and other military activities in the Kashmir may be exercises, but given India's internal problems, may be indicative of a diversion, which would include an incident involving Pakistan.

#### Cyprus

The trend is toward increasing instability due to Greek reinforcements on the island, a poor Greek Cypriot performance in its Security Council presentation, and a general belief that prolonged stalemate is to the disadvantage of the Greek position.

The UN Security Council resolution on Cyprus marks a transition from active diplomacy by the Secretary General and the disputants to a period of stalemate and increasing tensions. The recent visit by a Soviet

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deputy foreign minister to discuss the problem with Greek Cypriots also bodes for increasing instability as Greek Cypriots seem to be losing international sympathy.

## 3. Key Collection Issues

#### USSR

The absence of military support to harvest operations could be an important warning indicator of a reluctance to reduce force readiness. Therefore collection of potential Soviet force readiness improvement is a most significant near-term collection issue. We believe the current collection strategy is sufficiently targeted against these readiness issues.

#### <u>China</u>

High priority is being given to the Zhang Aiping visit to the US in June. Foreknowledge of Zhang's topics and Chinese desires relating to specific weapons systems would be very helpful.

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The Chinese view of Soviet cancellation of the Arkhipov visit would give us insights into the US/China/USSR relationship and Chinese willingness to accommodate a new visit.

# <u>Philippines</u>

NPA insurgency activities remain the highest priority intelligence gap. NPA activities are likely to gain even more importance in coming months given the economic uncertainties facing the Marcos government.

# Nicaragua

Continued collection is required to determine if the Cubans are preparing to deliver unassembled or operational MIG aircraft to Nicaragua.

# Suriname

All collection sources should be alert to signs of Suriname turning to Cuba for economic or military aid.

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